Two years ago, the News Media Bargaining Code was hailed as a world-first intervention that would force tech platforms to pay for news. Australia would show the world how to regulate Big Tech.

Now, with more perspective, we can assess what actually happened. The results are mixed—significant money flowed to publishers, but fundamental dynamics haven’t changed.

Here’s an honest evaluation.

What the Code Actually Did

Let me start with what the legislation achieved:

Significant payments to publishers. Google and Meta negotiated deals with Australian publishers worth hundreds of millions of dollars in total. The exact figures aren’t public, but industry estimates suggest $150-200 million annually.

Major publishers benefited most. News Corp, Nine, Seven, and the ABC secured the bulk of the value. The code’s structure—which threatened designation if platforms didn’t negotiate—gave large publishers leverage smaller ones lacked.

Regional and small publishers got something. The deals included provisions for smaller outlets, though the amounts were much smaller than what major publishers received.

A precedent was set. Australia’s approach influenced discussions globally. Canada followed with similar legislation. The EU, UK, and others have debated comparable measures.

What the Code Didn’t Do

The code’s limitations have also become clear:

It didn’t make journalism sustainable. The payments help, but they haven’t transformed the economics of Australian news. Layoffs continued. Business model challenges persist.

Small publishers remain vulnerable. The money that flowed to smaller outlets wasn’t enough to address their fundamental challenges. Many continue struggling.

Meta walked away. Facebook ceased news in Australia in early 2024 rather than continue negotiations. This wasn’t in the original script—the threat of platform exit was supposed to create leverage, but Meta actually followed through.

Platform dependency remains. The code addressed payment, not power. Publishers remain dependent on platform decisions—as Facebook’s exit demonstrated.

It may have accelerated platform news retreat. Some argue the regulatory pressure gave platforms reason to reduce news rather than pay for it. The code may have hastened the decoupling it was meant to manage.

The Money Question

The hundreds of millions that flowed to publishers sounds significant. Is it?

For major publishers, the money is meaningful but not transformative. News Corp’s Australian news operations have annual costs in the hundreds of millions—the platform payments help the P&L but don’t change the fundamental business model.

For regional and smaller publishers, the amounts were more proportionally significant but still insufficient to address structural challenges.

One criticism: the money didn’t come with requirements for how it would be spent. Publishers could use platform payments to improve journalism, or they could return it to shareholders. Transparency about fund use remains limited.

What Meta’s Exit Revealed

Meta’s decision to stop carrying news in Australia was the most significant development since the code passed.

It revealed the fundamental power asymmetry. Meta decided they’d rather have no Australian news than pay for it. That was their call to make, and publishers had no counter.

It showed the limits of regulatory leverage. The code’s threat model assumed platforms needed news enough that they’d pay rather than exit. That assumption was wrong, at least for Facebook.

It hurt publishers who’d become Facebook-dependent. For smaller outlets especially, Facebook traffic loss was devastating. The code created confidence that platforms would stay engaged; Facebook’s exit proved that confidence misplaced.

It demonstrated platform news is optional. For years, publishers believed platforms needed quality content. Meta proved they could walk away with limited consequence—to their business, if not to the news ecosystem.

Lessons for Other Countries

Countries considering similar legislation should note:

Platform exit is a real risk. Meta has now demonstrated willingness to remove news rather than pay for it. Any regulatory approach must account for this possibility.

Major publishers capture most value. Bargaining power correlates with size. Small publishers benefit only to the extent large ones advocate for them.

The code doesn’t address discovery. Even with payments, platforms control distribution. Algorithm changes can devastate traffic regardless of payment arrangements.

Enforcement matters. The code included mechanisms for designation if platforms didn’t negotiate. But these mechanisms were never tested because Google negotiated quickly and Meta eventually exited rather than be designated.

Revenue isn’t sustainability. Platform payments can help. They can’t substitute for sustainable business models.

What Should Come Next

If I were advising policy makers:

Address discovery, not just payment. Platform algorithm changes arguably matter more than payments. Regulation that only addresses compensation misses the bigger issue.

Consider small publishers separately. The bargaining dynamics that work for major publishers don’t apply to small ones. Different mechanisms may be needed.

Build independent infrastructure. Rather than forcing platforms to support news, consider building public infrastructure—distribution networks, technology platforms, business services—that reduces platform dependency.

Require transparency. Where public intervention creates private benefits, require transparency about how those benefits are used.

Plan for platform exit. Any regulation must include contingencies for platforms simply leaving rather than complying.

The Bigger Picture

The Media Bargaining Code was an important experiment, but not the solution to journalism’s challenges.

Platform payments provided a temporary boost without addressing fundamental sustainability. The code assumed a platform-publisher relationship that platforms have shown they’re willing to abandon.

The path to sustainable journalism runs through direct audience relationships, diversified revenue, and reduced platform dependency—not through regulatory interventions that assume platforms will play along.

Australia’s experiment taught valuable lessons. Other countries should learn from them—including recognizing the limits of what regulation can achieve.